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Abstract— Fallback authentication is used to retrieve forgotten 
passwords. Security questions are one of the main techniques 
used to conduct fallback authentication. In this paper, we 
propose a serious game design that uses system-generated 
security questions with the aim of improving the usability of 
fallback authentication. For this purpose, we adopted the 
popular picture-based “4 Pics 1 word” mobile game. This game 
was selected because of its use of pictures and cues, which 
previous psychology research found to be crucial to aid 
memorability. This game asks users to pick the word that relates 
to the given pictures. We then customized this game by adding 
features which help maximize the following memory retrieval 
skills: (a) verbal cues - by providing hints with verbal 
descriptions; (b) spatial cues - by maintaining the same order of 
pictures; (c) graphical cues - by showing 4 images for each 
challenge; (d) interactivity/engaging nature of the game. 
Keywords - Cyber Security, Fallback Authentication; Security 
Questions, Serious Games, Memorability. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s 
Yahoo! email account was “hijacked" in the run-up to the 2008 
US election. The “hacker" simply used the password reset 
prompt and answered her security questions [1]. As reported 
[1], the Palin hack didn’t require much technical skills. Instead, 
the hacker merely used social engineering techniques to reset 
Palin’s password using her birthdate, ZIP code and information 
about where she met her spouse. The answers to these 
questions were easily accessible with a quick Google search. 
Also, as more of our personal information is available online, it 
is becoming easier for attackers to retrieve this information, 
through observational attacks, from social networking 
websites, such as Facebook [2], Twitter or even more 
professional websites like LinkedIn [3]. Besides observational 
attacks, security questions are also vulnerable to guessing 
attacks, in which, attackers try to access accounts by providing 
low entropy (i.e., level of complexity) answers (e.g., favorite 
color: blue). These attacks are part of a series of Cyber-threats 
which usually include computer viruses and other types of 
malicious software (malware), unsolicited e-mail (spam), 
eavesdropping software (spyware), orchestrated campaigns 
aiming to make computer resources unavailable to the intended 
users (distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks), social 
engineering, and online identity theft (phishing). Hence, the 
ease of conducting observational and guessing attacks has 
increased the vulnerabilities of fallback authentication 
mechanisms [4] towards all these cyber-threats, which are 
leading to severe consequences, such as monetary loss, 
embarrassment and inconvenience [5]. 
A possible way to reduce the vulnerability of security 
questions towards these kind of attacks is by encouraging users 
to use system-generated answers [5]. One particular technique 
uses an Avatar to represent system-generated data of a 
fictitious person (see Figure 1), and then the Avatar’s system-
generated data is used to answer security questions [5]. 
However, the main barrier towards widespread adoption of 
these techniques is memorability [6], since users struggle to 
remember the details of system-generated information to 
answer their security questions. 
Thus, to address this problem with memorability of system-
generated data, in this paper we present a game design that 
focuses on enhancing users’ memorability of answers to 
security questions. This paper investigates the elements 
(obtained from the literature [7] [8] [9] [10]) that should be 
addressed in the game design to create and consequently 
nurture the bond between users and their avatar profiles 
(system-generated data). For the purpose of our research, we 
adopted the popular picture-based “4 Pics 1 Word” 1mobile 
game. This game asks users to pick the word that relates the 
given pictures (e.g., for the pictures in Figure 2a the relating 
word would be “Germany”). This game was selected because 
of its use of pictures and cues, in which, previous psychology 
research has found to be important to help with memorability 
[7] [11]. 
For the purpose of our research we adopted the game, so 
that at certain intervals, it asks users to solve avatar-based 
challenges. Since previous research on memorability found that 
recognition is a simpler memory task than recall [12], besides 
recall-based challenges (see Figure 3a), in our game, we also 
provide recognition-based challenges (see Figure 3b). Hence, 
the proposed game design focuses on encoding the system-
generated data to users’ long-term memory [11] and to aide 
memorability by using the following memory retrieval skills 
[13]: (a) graphical cues - by using images in each challenge; (b) 
                                                            
1 https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de. 
lotum.whatsinthefoto.us&hl=en 
. 
verbal cues - by using verbal descriptions as hints; (c) spatial 
cues - by keeping same order of pictures; and (d) interactivity - 
interactive/engaging nature of the game through the use of 
persuasive technology principles [9]. 
In the following sections, we describe the fallback 
authentication mechanisms that are currently being used. We 
then identify the strengths and weaknesses of research on 
security questions to show why our research is important and 
how it is considerably different from previous research that has 
been conducted in this field. Afterwards, we describe the main 
contribution of this paper, which is a unique game design that 
uses gamification and memorability concepts to improve the 
memorability of fallback authentication. Finally, we conclude 
this paper by presenting the prototype that we will use to 
evaluate the proposed game design in a lab study. 
II. BACKGROUND 
As computer users have to deal with an increasing number 
of online accounts [14] [15] they are finding it more difficult to 
remember all passwords for their different accounts. For 
example, if we look just at social networking websites, plenty 
of users have different accounts for Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, SnapChat and LinkedIn. Since password managers 
have not been widely adopted [16], resetting of passwords is 
becoming a more frequent task [14] [15]. To address this 
problem various forms of fallback authentication mechanisms 
have been evaluated with the most popular being security 
questions [17] (focus of this research) and email-based 
password reset. Although email-based (or in some cases even 
SMS-based) password recovery has been widely adopted by 
major organizations (e.g., Google) they still have the limitation 
of being vulnerable to ‘man in the middle’ attacks, since these 
emails are not encrypted [18]. Other fallback authentication 
mechanisms (e.g., social authentication [19]) have also been 
evaluated though they have not been widely adopted [20], since 
they are vulnerable to impersonation both by insiders and by 
face-recognition tools [21]. 
Figure 1.  System-generated Avatar profile as defined by Micallef and Just 
2011 [5] 
Security questions are the most widely adopted form of 
fallback authentication [20] [15] since they are used by a 
variety of popular organizations (e.g., Banks, E-commerce 
websites, Social networks). Security questions are set-up at 
account creation. Then when they want to reset their password, 
users will have to recall the answers that they provided when 
setting up the account. Several studies have found that security 
questions have the following major limitations: (1) can be 
guessed by choosing the most popular answers [3]; (2) have 
memorability problems since they are not frequently used [6], 
which decreases their level of usability [22]; (3) are easily 
guessed by friends, family members and acquaintances [23] 
[24]; (4) can be guessed by observational attacks, with a quick 
Google search or by searching victims’ social networking 
websites [2]. Recent studies, conducted using security 
questions data collected by Google [22], found that security 
questions are neither usable (low memorability) nor secure 
enough to be used as the main account recovery mechanism. 
This means that new techniques need to be investigated to 
provide a more secure and memorable form of fallback 
authentication. 
In the last years, mobile devices became one of the main 
mediums to access the web and people started storing (and 
accessing) more sensitive information on these devices [25]. 
Hence, the focus of authentication research has shifted to 
primarily investigate new techniques (e.g., data driven 
authentication using sensors [26]) to conduct authentication on 
mobile devices [27] [28]. Most of the research in this area tried 
to leverage the use of the variety of inbuilt sensors (e.g., 
accelerometer, magnetometer) that are available on today’s 
mobile devices, with the main goal of striking a balance 
between usability and security when conducting authentication 
[29] [30]. However, sensors have also been used in fallback 
authentication mechanisms on smartphones [31] as a technique 
that extracts autobiographical information [32] about the users’ 
smartphone behavior during the last couple of days. This 
information is then used to answer security questions about 
recent smartphone use [33]. Although these innovative security 
questions techniques have managed to achieve memorability 
rates of about 95% using a diverse set of questions [34] [35], 
these techniques have mostly been evaluated with a younger 
user-base (mean age of 26), those users that use smartphones 
the most [36]. Hence, we argue that other techniques need to be 
investigated to cater for those users who do not use 
smartphones or use them but not very frequently (e.g. age 50+). 
Besides the previously described work on autobiographical 
security questions, recent research has also investigated: (1) 
life-experiences passwords - which consists of several facts 
about a user-chosen past experience, such as a trip, graduation, 
or wedding, etc. [37]; (2) security meters - to encourage users 
to improve the strength of their security answers [38] and (3) 
avatar profiles - to represent system-generated data of a 
fictitious person (see Figure 1), and then the Avatar’s 
information is used to answer security questions [5]. Although 
life-experience passwords [37] were evaluated to be stronger 
then passwords and less guessable then security questions. 
However, the memorability after 6 months was still about 50%. 
The work on security meters for security questions [38] seems 
 to be quite promising, however it is still at an embryonic stage 
and it requires further research to evaluate its feasibility. 
Using system-generated data (see Figure 1), in the form of 
an avatar profile, to answer security questions [5] has also not 
been extensively investigated. However, in our research we 
attempt to investigate this work further because compared to 
other research on security questions it seems to be the one that 
has the potential to achieve the optimal balance in terms of 
security and memorability due to the following reasons: (1) it 
could be tailored for everyone (and not only for those users 
with medium/high smartphone usage); (2) guessing attacks 
could be minimized because the entropy and variety of the 
answers could be defined/controlled by the system that 
generates them; (3) risks of having observational attacks would 
be minimal since the system-generated avatar information 
would not be publicly available; and (4) memorability could be 
achieved by using a gamified approach to create and nurture a 
bond between users and their avatar profiles (in the form of 
system-generated data as in Figure 1). 
Bonneau and Schechter found that most users can 
memorize passwords when using tools that support learning 
over time [39]. However, we know to our cost, no-one has 
attempted to use serious games to improve the users’ 
memorability of systems-generated answers for security 
questions. Thus, in our research, we attempt to use a gamified 
approach to improve users’ memorability during fallback 
authentication because previous work in the security field [40] 
has successfully used this approach to educate users about the 
susceptibility to phishing attacks [41] with the aim of teaching 
users to be less prone to these types of security vulnerabilities 
[42]. Hence, this paper contributes to the field of fallback 
authentication by proposing a game design which uses long-
term memory and memory retrieval skills [13] to improve the 
memorability of security answers based on a system-generated 
avatar profile. 
III. GAME DESIGN 
The main challenge in designing usable security questions 
mechanisms is to create associations with answers that are 
strong and to maintain them over time. In our research we use 
previous findings on the understanding of long-term memory to 
design a game which has the aim of improving the 
memorability of system-generated answers for security 
questions. Atkinson and Shiffrin [11] proposed a cognitive 
memory model, in which, new information is transferred to 
short-term memory through the sensory organs. The short-term 
memory holds this new information as mental representations 
of selected parts of the information. This information is only 
passed from short-term memory to long-term memory when it 
can be encoded through cue-association [11] (e.g., when we see 
a cat it reminds us of our first cat). This encoding through cue-
association helps people to remember and retrieve the stored 
information over an extended period of time. These encodings 
are strengthened through constant rehearsals. Also, psychology 
research has found that humans are better at remembering 
images than textual information (known as the picture 
superiority effect) [7]. In section IIIA, we describe how we use 
these psychology concepts to adopt the popular “4 Pics 1 
Word” mobile game for the purpose of our research. We create 
encoding associations (bond) with the avatar profile by using 
the picture-based nature of this game and by adding verbal 
cues. Then in section IIIB we describe how we strengthen these 
encodings by having users constantly rehearse associations 
(nurture the bond) through persuasive technology principles 
[9]. 
A. Game Features 
In most instances, the game functions similarly to the “4 
Pics 1 Word” mobile game, meaning that the game asks 
players to pick the word that relates the given pictures (e.g., for 
the pictures in Figure 2a the relating word would be 
“Germany”). However, at certain intervals, the game asks 
players to solve avatar-based challenges. The optimal number 
of times that players will be given avatar-based challenges 
during a day to learn the system-generated avatar information 
will be investigated in a field study. The game provides players 
with a pool of 12 letters to assist them with solving the 
challenge. For each given answer, players are either rewarded 
or deducted points based on whether they provided the correct 
or wrong answer (10 points when answering standard 
challenges, 15 points when answering avatar-based recognition 
challenges, 20 points when answering avatar-based recall 
challenges). Points can be used to obtain hints to help in 
solving more difficult challenges (deduction of 30/50 points). 
Figure 2.  Examples of standard game challenges. 
Researchers in psychology have defined two main theories 
to explain how humans handle recall and recognition: 
Generate-recognize theory [43] and Strength theory [12]. 
According to the generate-recognize theory [43] recall is a two 
phase process: Phase 1 - A list of possible words is formed by 
looking into long-term memory; Phase 2 - The list of possible 
words is evaluated to determine if the word that is being looked 
for is within the list. According to this theory recognition does 
not use the first phase, hence it’s easier and faster to perform. 
According to strength theory [12] recall and recognition require 
the same memory tasks, however recognition is easier since it 
requires a lower level of strength. When it comes to avatar-
based challenges, in our game we decided to use both recall 
  
and recognition challenges (see Figure 3) because having only 
recognition challenges would have lowered the security level 
of the game, since the answer space would have been very 
small. Hence, to try and strike a balance between security and 
memorability, we designed the avatar challenges part of the 
game so that it starts by showing mostly recognition-based 
challenges (see Figure 3b). Then as players get more 
accustomed to the avatar profile and they learn the system-
generated data (strengthening of the bond) the avatar-based 
challenges would become mainly recall-based (see Figure 3a). 
Figure 3.  Examples of recall and recognition-based avatar challenges. 
Psychology research [43] [44] has shown that it is difficult 
to remember information spontaneously without having any 
kind of memory cues. Hence, we added a feature that shows 
verbal cues about each picture (see Figure 2b). This feature can 
be enabled by using the points (30/50 points) that are gathered 
when solving other game challenges as the player goes through 
the game. We decided to add this feature, especially for the 
avatar-based challenges, so that players can focus their 
attention on associating the words with the corresponding cues 
(pictures). We hypothesize that this should help to process and 
encode the information in memory and store it in the long-term 
memory [13]. 
Figure 4.  Examples of rewards and game visualizations. 
We decided to have a fixed set of images and always show 
the same images in the same order because this helps 
enhancing semantic priming [13]. Meaning that it will help 
players recognize the answer by associating it with the other 
images that are presented with it. To improve the security 
element of the game, especially when solving avatar-based 
challenges, our game does not show the length of the word that 
needs to be guessed. This feature makes the game more 
difficult, but we argue that it increases the level of security. 
B. Engagement 
To nurture the bond between players and their avatars, we 
will use constant rehearsals to strengthen the encodings of 
associations with the system-generated data, in the players’ 
long-term memory. We plan to achieve this by using the 
following persuasive technology principles proposed by Fogg 
[9] and also used in [45]: 
Tunnelling: Tunnelling is the process of providing a game 
experience which contains opportunity for persuasion [9]. 
Players are more likely to engage in a tunnelling experience 
when they can see tangible results [45]. For this reason, at the 
beginning of the game, the avatar-based challenges are mostly 
recognition-based rather than recall-based. We hypothesize that 
in this way it is less likely that players will stop playing the 
game due to being exposed to difficult challenges at the 
beginning. Also, at this stage of the game obtaining hints 
requires a low amount of points (30 points). Additional levels 
of difficulty (recall-based challenges) become available only as 
players either demonstrate sufficient skill, or play the game for 
several days or weeks. As the player goes through the game the 
cost (in points) of buying hints or obtain verbal cues will 
increase as well (50 points). 
Conditioning: According to persuasive technology 
principles [9] players can be conditioned to play a game if they 
are offered rewards to compensate their progress. In our game 
we reward players with points when they solve challenges 
correctly (more points are given when avatar-based challenges 
are solved, recall-based challenges provide more points than 
recognition-based challenges). The more points players collect 
the more hints they can obtain when they are struggling to 
solve other game challenges. We also reward players with the 
following badges (see Figure 4) each time that they solve 
avatar-based challenges: (1) a “smiley” badge when they solve 
1 avatar challenge (see Figure 4a); (2) a “cake” badge when 
they solve half of the daily avatar challenges (see Figure 4b); 
(3) a “trophy” badge when they solve all daily avatar 
challenges (see Figure 4c). Special sounds and visualizations 
are displayed when these badges or an important milestone is 
achieved (see Figure 4d). 
Suggestion: Persuasive technology principles [9] suggest 
that messages and notifications should be well timed in order to 
be more effective. For this reason in our game we send 
notifications to remind players to play the game every 24 
hours, if they did not play the game during that time frame. 
Also, every 24 hours we provide hints when players are stuck 
with a game challenge. 
Self-monitoring: Persuasive technology principles [9] state 
that constantly showing progress can motivate players to 
improve their performance. For this reason, in our game we 
show the score and the progress in solving avatar-based 
challenges each time that players play the game. We also show 
. 
graphs on how many avatar-based challenges were solved 
correctly during a day/week/month and how many challenges 
still need to be solved to progress to the next stage. We 
hypothesize that these tools will help players identify areas for 
improvement and provide motivation to continue playing the 
game with the aim of improving performance. 
Surveillance and Social Cues: According to persuasive 
technology [9], players are more encouraged to perform certain 
actions if others are aware of these actions and by leveraging 
social cues. In our game, we implement a social element of 
surveillance by: (1) congratulating players when they return to 
play the game every day; (2) applaud players when they reach 
an important game milestone; (3) encourage players even when 
they get incorrect answers; (4) express disappointment when 
players don’t play the game regularly. 
Humour, Fun and Challenges: Affect is also an important 
factor to enhance players’ motivation [45]. To make the game 
more fun we included emoticons when sending reminders or 
when communicating with players. This is also the reason why 
we selected humoristic badges (smiley, cake, trophy) to reward 
players when they reach avatar-related milestones (see Figure 
4). Our motivation is to keep players interested and engaged in 
playing the game. 
Figure 5.  Prototype Game Logic. 
IV. PROTOTYPE GAME LOGIC 
In our lab study we plan to evaluate a game prototype by 
using the following logic. As shown in Figure 5, the game 
starts by picking a random standard challenge from a pool of 7 
standard challenges (all players will experience the same 
standard challenges but in a random order). After completing a 
standard challenge, the game player is deducted/awarded 
points. Afterwards, the challenge is removed from the pool of 
available challenges. At this stage the player is presented with a 
randomly selected avatar-based recognition challenge (based 
on the avatar profile that they selected prior to playing the 
game). If the player picks the correct answer, a badge is 
rewarded based on how many avatar-based challenges they 
solved. The player will continue to be presented with alternate 
standard and avatar-based recognition challenges until they 
complete the 3 avatar-based recognition challenges. After that, 
the player is prompted with alternate standard and avatar-based 
recall challenges until all 3 recall avatar-based challenges are 
completed. This is where the game ends. In total, each player 
will complete 7 standard challenges, 3 recognition and 3 recall 
avatar-based challenges.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The proposed game design outlined in this paper teaches 
and nudges users to provide stronger answers to security 
questions to protect themselves against observational and 
guessing attacks. Since this technique uses system-generated 
data (see Figure 1), it is quite unlikely that attackers would be 
able to retrieve the avatar-based answers from google 
searches/social networks or through guessing attacks. We 
believe that helping users to memorize the avatar’s system-
generated data through an engaging/interactive gamified 
approach can help users create and nurture a bond with their 
avatar. This will be achieved by encoding information in long-
term memory through constant rehearsals with the aim of 
improving memorability of fallback authentication (i.e., 
security questions). In our future work, we will conduct studies 
to involve users in this game design (by using the prototype 
described in section IV and logic shown in Figure 5) to further 
optimize the functionalities of the game and determine any 
security vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Afterwards, 
we will conduct a field study to evaluate different rehearsal 
configurations to determine the optimal rehearsal parameters 
that need to be adopted so that users could use this game to 
learn and remember the system-generated avatar profile. 
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